

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

In re Application of:)
Edward L. Beery II) Group Art Unit: 1751
Serial No.: 09/954,823) Examiner: Nguyen, Tri V.
Filing Date: September 18, 2001) Confirmation No.: 8192
For: System for Delivery of Promotional Savings

REPLY BRIEF

To: Commissioner for Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir:

This Reply Brief is submitted in response to the Examiner's Answer mailed May 19, 2009.

ARGUMENT

I. Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. §102

Claims 9-23, 25, 26, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,055,513 to Katz, et al (hereinafter, “Katz”). These rejections must be reversed because the Examiner has failed to establish that Katz anticipates the pending claims.

Both the grounds of rejection and the text cited to support the rejections in the Examiner’s Answer appear to be identical to the grounds of rejection and the text cited in the final Office Action mail July 18, 2006. The only substantive changes to the Examiner’s arguments begin on page 7 of the Examiner’s answer, under the heading “Examiner’s Response.” Therefore, this reply brief will focus on the arguments proffered by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Response section.

Initially, Appellant note that the Examiner’s answer remains deficient for at least the following reasons. First, the Examiner appears to misunderstand which party bears the burden of proof with respect to establishing a *prima facie* case of anticipation. As noted in the Appeal Brief, “It is by now well settled that the burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of anticipation resides with the Patent and Trademark Office.” *Ex parte Skinner*, 2 USPQ2d 1788, 1788-1789 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1986) (holding that examiner failed to establish *prima facie* case of anticipation). Only if that burden is met, does the burden of going forward shift to the Appellant.

In this case, the rejections in the final Office Action failed to establish with any degree of particularity the manner in which Katz discloses the elements of the pending claims. Therefore, the rejections in the final office action failed to establish a *prima facie*

case of anticipation. The Appeal Brief set forth in clear and concise terms the deficiencies in the final action, and invited the Examiner to point out with particularity the sections of Katz which allegedly disclose the elements of the pending claims. The first Examiner's Answer made no attempt to point out specifically which sections of Katz allegedly disclose the elements of the pending claims. Instead, the Examiner's Answer simply cited broad sections of Katz and asserts that the sections must disclose the pending claims.

The second Examiner's Answer provides a mapping between the claims and various sections of Katz. However, the arguments proffered in the Examiner's Answer remain completely irrelevant because they are wholly unrelated to the specific language of the pending claims. The Examiner argues repeatedly that Katz anticipates the pending claims because Katz discloses triggering an upsell based on data elements associated with a primary transaction/interaction. Even assuming, *arguendo*, that the Examiner is correct, Katz still cannot anticipate the pending claims because the pending claims recite structure and operations far more specific than simply triggering an upsell based on data elements associated with a primary transaction/interaction.

The core of the distinction between this application and the system described in Katz is that this application is product-centric; Katz is not. More particularly, the claims pending in this application are directed to a computer-based method, system, and a computer program product for offering a customer a promotion offer *based on a product identifier in a customer request*. By way of example, claim 1 is directed to receiving a signal identifying a first product associated with an order, associating a first product identifier with the first product, and presenting one or more promotions for a second product based on the first product identifier. By contrast, *because the system described in Katz is not product-centric, Katz neither discloses nor suggests any of these limitations.*

In the interest of brevity, many arguments and excerpts from Katz set forth in the Appeal Brief and the previous Reply Brief will not be repeated in this document. Nonetheless, these arguments are incorporated herein.

A. Legal Standard for Anticipation

The standard for lack of novelty, that is, for “anticipation,” under 35 U.S.C. §102 is one of strict identity. To anticipate a claim for a patent, a single prior source must contain all its essential elements. *Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 231 USPQ 81, 90 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Invalidity for anticipation requires that all of the elements and limitations of the claims be found within a single prior art reference. *Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.*, 18 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Every element of the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim. *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that the jury had been erroneously instructed that anticipation may be shown by equivalents, a legal theory that is pertinent to obviousness under Section 103, not to anticipation under Section 102). “The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the patent claim.” MPEP §2131 (7th Ed. 1998) (citing *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, functional language, preambles, and language in “whereby,” “thereby,” and “adapted to” clauses cannot be disregarded. *Pac-Tec, Inc. v. Amerace Corp.*, 14 USPQ2d 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

“It is by now well settled that the burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of anticipation resides with the Patent and Trademark Office.” *Ex parte Skinner*, 2 USPQ2d 1788, 1788-1789 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1986) (holding that examiner failed to establish *prima facie* case of anticipation). The examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis

for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting *In re Warner*, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016, 154 USPQ 173, 177 (CCPA 1967)). Only if that burden is met, does the burden of going forward shift to the Appellant.

B. *Claims 9 and 17*

Neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s Answer establish a *prima facie* case that Katz anticipates claim 9. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires that *each and every element* of the claim be set forth in the manner recited in the claim in a single prior art reference. (See, MPEP 2131). Moreover, the Examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Claim 9 is directed to a method for presenting one or more promotions and recites a limitations directed to:

receiving, in a computing system, a signal identifying a first product associated with an order;
associating a first product identifier with the first product;
presenting, via a user interface, one or more promotions when one or more promotions for at least a second product are associated with the first product identifier.

As the Appeal Brief makes clear, the cited sections from Katz fails to disclose *any* of the elements recited in claim 9. First, contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, nothing in the text cited from Katz discloses (or even suggests) receiving, in a computing system, a signal identifying a first product associated with an order. In fact, the cited text from Katz is wholly silent with respect to the manner in which a user identifies a product. Further, contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, nothing in the text cited from Katz discloses (or even suggests) associating a first product identifier with the first product. A close review of column 17, line 54 through column 18, line 15 reveals that the text fails even to mention products or product

identifiers, much less the specific step of associating a first product identifier with the first product. Finally, nothing in the cited text discloses (or even suggests) presenting, via a user interface, one or more promotions when one or more promotions for at least a second product are associated with the first product identifier. A close examination of column 13, lines 27-51, column 17, line 37 to column 18, line 15, column 23, line 62 to column 25, line 55, and column 26, line 66 to column 27, line 21 reveals that Katz discloses offering an upsell based on a number of factors, none of which correspond to offering a promotion for a second product when the second product is associated with the first product identifier.

In the Examiner's Response section of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner asserts that Katz anticipates claim 9 because Katz discloses a telemarketing method that is implemented in a computer network system in which a primary transaction/interaction triggers an up selling opportunity that is based on data elements associated with the primary transaction/interaction. The Examiner further asserts that the Katz reference defines the term upsell as an offer or provision of a good or service which is selected for offer to the customer and it differs from the good or service for which the primary contact was made. The term upsell is not limited to the context in which a primary transaction is intended to be a sales transaction, but additionally includes the offer of a good or service offered in accordance with the selection criteria of the invention even if the primary transaction is not principally sales motivated, such as where an initial contact is for service or repair purposes. The various upsells (i.e., a product or service related to the primary transaction) are presented to the user via the computer interface.

Appellant expresses no opinion on the accuracy of the Examiner's characterization of the Katz reference. However, the Examiner's characterization of the Katz reference is wholly unrelated to the language of the limitations recited in claim 9. Therefore, even if the

Examiner's characterization is accurate, Katz still cannot anticipate claim 9.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner's answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation of claim 9. Furthermore, Katz fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 9, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 9. Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) must be reversed.

Claim 17 recites corresponding limitations. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to claim 17.

C. Claims 10 and 18

Neither the final Action nor the Examiner's Answer establish a *prima facie* case that Katz anticipates claim 10. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires that *each and every element* of the claim be set forth in the manner recited in the claim in a single prior art reference. (See, MPEP 2131). Moreover, the Examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Claim 10 recites limitations including “determining, based on the first product identifier, whether one or more promotions for at least a second product are associated with the first product identifier.” The final Action asserted that Katz discloses this limitation, and cited column 23, line 62 to column 25, line 55 to support the rejection. Appellant traversed the rejection. The second Examiner's Answer maintains the rejection and now cites column 24, lines 31-49 to support the rejection. The newly cited text reads as follows:

Other factors affecting the upsell may include inputs comprising areas of interest, such as based upon known subscriptions, prior contact of the user to other sites, such as other Internet sites may be utilized by the system to determine a user's possible interests, and therefore, their susceptibility to the upsell of particular goods or services. Yet another aspect of basing the upsell selection on prior purchases may include upgrades to prior purchases. For example, where the system determines that the user has previously purchased a computer of a given make and model, the system may offer as an upsell a

good or service particularly adapted to improve the performance of the system of the user, such as provision of additional memory, or other modified component. Similarly, if a user is known to have a given version of software, the system may elect to offer a new version of the software. Obsolescence of prior purchases may be determined. This may be from the passage of time, updating of a product, or outgrowing of a prior purchase.

Initially, Appellant notes that claim 10 depends from claim 9 and thereby incorporates the limitations of claim 9. Thus, the product identifier recited in claim 10 refers to the product identifier received with the order, not a product identifier associated with a previous sale. Katz simply does not disclose an arrangement in which a product identifier associated with a received order can trigger a promotional offer of a second product. There is a meaningful difference between these systems. The system described and claim in this application operates in real-time. A user of the present system can offer a real-time promotion in response to a current order placed by a customer. By contrast, the Katz system is not a real-time system. It cannot provide this functionality.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner's answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation of claim 10. Furthermore, Katz fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 10, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 10. Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) must be reversed.

Claim 18 recites corresponding limitations. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to claim 18.

D. Claims 11 and 19

Neither the final Action nor the Examiner's Answer establish a *prima facie* case that Katz anticipates claim 11. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires that *each and every element* of the claim be set forth in the manner recited in the claim in a single prior art reference. (See, MPEP 2131). Moreover, the Examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468,

1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Claim 11 recites limitations including “comparing the first product identifier with a list of product identifiers associated with promotional offers.” The final Action asserted that Katz discloses this limitation, and cited column 23, line 62 to column 25, line 55 to support the rejection. The second Examiner’s Answer maintains the rejection and now cites column 23, lines 40-60 to support the rejection. The newly cited text reads as follows:

Yet another form of database information includes inventory data 336. In determining the items for upsell, the inventory database may be consulted before, during, or after the upsell determination. The upsell may discount the offering of a product which is unavailable at that time. In another aspect, the system may yet still offer the product if it will become available in a timely manner. As yet a further aspect of inventory status, a delivery time window may be included, such that if the product cannot be obtained from inventory and delivered to the customer in a timely manner, that product is not offered as an upsell.

Even a cursory examination of this text cited in the Examiner’s answer reveals that it neither discloses nor suggests comparing the first product identifier with a list of product identifiers associated with promotional offers, as recited in claim 11. The Examiner’s position appears to be fabricated from whole cloth.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation of claim 11. Furthermore, Katz fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 11, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 11. Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) must be reversed.

Claim 19 recites corresponding limitations. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to claim 19.

E. *Claim 12*

Neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s Answer establish a *prima facie* case that Katz anticipates claim 12. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires that *each and every element* of

the claim be set forth in the manner recited in the claim in a single prior art reference. (See, MPEP 2131). Moreover, the Examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Claim 12 recites limitations including “wherein a promotion is associated with a combination of one or more product identifiers.” The final Action asserted that Katz discloses this limitation, and cited column 23, lines 40-60 and line 67 to column 24, line 1 to support the rejection. Appellant traversed the rejection, and invited the Examiner to point out with specificity. The second Examiner’s Answer maintains the rejection and now cites column 23, lines 40-60 to support the rejection. The newly cited text reads as follows:

Yet another form of database information includes inventory data 336. In determining the items for upsell, the inventory database may be consulted before, during, or after the upsell determination. The upsell may discount the offering of a product which is unavailable at that time. In another aspect, the system may yet still offer the product if it will become available in a timely manner. As yet a further aspect of inventory status, a delivery time window may be included, such that if the product cannot be obtained from inventory and delivered to the customer in a timely manner, that product is not offered as an upsell.

The process includes the identification or selection of a set or subset of all possible goods or services available for offer, with the goal of optimizing the likelihood of upsell, as well as achieving customer satisfaction.

Even a cursory examination of this text cited in the Examiner’s answer reveals that it neither discloses nor suggests an arrangement wherein a promotion is associated with a combination of one or more product identifiers, as recited in claim 12. The Examiner’s position appears to be fabricated from whole cloth.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation of claim 12. Furthermore, Katz fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 12, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 12.

Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) must be reversed.

F. Claims 13 and 20

Neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s Answer establish a *prima facie* case that Katz anticipates claim 13. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires that *each and every element* of the claim be set forth in the manner recited in the claim in a single prior art reference. (See, MPEP 2131). Moreover, the Examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Claim 13 recites limitations including “presenting one or more replacement products in the user interface.” The final Action asserted that Katz discloses this limitation, and cited column 23, line 62 to column 25, line 55 to support the rejection. Appellant traversed the rejection, and invited the Examiner to point out with specificity. The second Examiner’s Answer maintains the rejection and now cites column 24, line 45 to support the rejection. The newly cited text reads as follows:

Similarly, if a user is known to have a given version of software, the system may elect to offer a new version of the software.

Initially, Appellant notes that claim 13 depends from claim 9 and thereby incorporates the limitations of claim 9. Thus, the replacement product recited in claim 13 refers to the product identifier received with the order, not a product identifier associated with a previous sale. Katz simply does not disclose an arrangement in which a product identifier associated with a received order can trigger a promotional offer of a replacement product. Again, this system is a real-time system; Katz is not a real-time system.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation of claim 13. Furthermore, Katz

fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 12, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 12.

Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) must be reversed.

Claim 20 recites corresponding limitations. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to claim 20.

G. Claims 23 and 26

Neither the final Action nor the first or second Examiner's Answer establish a *prima facie* case that Katz anticipates claim 23. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires that *each and every element* of the claim be set forth in the manner recited in the claim in a single prior art reference. (See, MPEP 2131). Moreover, the Examiner has “the burden of proof . . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 or 103.” *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Claim 23 is directed to a computer-based method of delivering a promotional offer to a consumer and recites a limitations directed to:

storing criteria for a promotional offer in a computer-readable memory;
receiving, in a computing system, a signal identifying a first product associated with a consumer order;
comparing a first product identifier associated with the first product with the criteria for a promotional offer; and
presenting a promotional offer in a user interface when the first product identifier corresponds to a criteria for a promotional offer.

As the Appeal Brief makes clear, the cited sections from Katz fails to disclose *any* of the elements recited in claim 23. The second Examiner's Answer maintains the rejection and now cites column 17, line 54 to column 18, line 39 to support the rejection. The newly cited text reads as follows:

Based upon the retrieved information as provided to the live operator 42, a dialog is conducted relating to the primary transaction for which the customer 74 made the primary or initial contact with the system. While handling the primary transaction, the system may access one or more databases 50, such as a credit database 54 and a inventory database 56. If the user's credit card number has been obtained, such as during the primary transaction, or is otherwise known to the telemarketer through prior contacts or is devined via a correlation system, the credit card number may be utilized to obtain raw or analyzed data regarding the caller. The response from the credit card issuer or processor may be specific, such as providing data on the user's income, sex, history of purchase transactions or any other personal or demographic information known to it, or may provide a analyzed, coded message in response. The credit information, personal information, demographic information, possession information or other form of input data is then used by

the system to generate the upsells or other real time provision of a secondary transaction. The secondary transaction may relate to the offer of a good or a service, or to a coupon, ticket, card or other promotional material having a variable or designated value for the purchase, lease or other acquisition in the future of a good or a service. In the preferred embodiment, there is a real time offer during a real time transaction. If the transaction is consummated, an indication may be provided to an order fulfillment unit 120 and attendant units such as the billing unit 122 and shipping/tracking unit 124.

Within the contemplation of the inventions, while a customer 74 is interacting with the operator 42 with respect to the primary transaction, the upsell system 70 is obtaining various input information for generation of a potential upsell item. As shown in FIG. 2, data regarding the instant call 60 may pass from the telemarketing system 40 to various databases 50, such as directly through path 62, or alternatively, from database A 52 to database B 54 via path 70.

Database A 52 may provide in return analyzed or raw data 66, and similarly database B 54 may provide analyzed or raw data 64 to the analysis system 70 for processing in accordance with the inventions herein. Upon generating the potential upsells, that information is provided to the telemarketing system 40, for presentation to the operator 42 on the terminal 92. As described in more detail in connection with FIG. 8, multiple options may be presented for selection by the operator 42. If a transaction is then consummated with respect to the upsell, the order fulfillment unit 120 and associated units may be utilized as in connection with the primary transaction. As described further below, the data from the proffer of the upsell may then be utilized in subsequent transactions, such as by storing the information in memory 96, or by utilizing it in connection with the determining unit 110..

First, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, nothing in the text cited from Katz discloses (or even suggests) storing criteria for a promotional offer in a computer-readable memory or receiving, in a computing system, a signal identifying a first product associated with a consumer order. Further, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, nothing in the text cited from Katz discloses (or even suggests) comparing a first product identifier associated with the first product with the criteria for a promotional offer.

A close review of column the cited text reveals that the text fails even to mention products or product identifiers, much less the specific step of comparing a first product identifier associated with the first product with the criteria for a promotional offer. Finally, nothing in the cited text discloses (or even suggests) presenting a promotional offer in a user

interface when the first product identifier corresponds to a criteria for a promotional offer. A close examination of Katz reveals that Katz discloses offering an upsell based on a number of factors, none of which correspond to presenting a promotional offer in a user interface when the first product identifier corresponds to a criteria for a promotional offer. Further, as described above, Katz is not a real-time system.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner's answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation of claim 23. Furthermore, Katz fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 23, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 23. Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) must be reversed.

Claim 26 recites corresponding limitations. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to claim 26.

II. Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. §103

Claims 24 and 27 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Katz. Appellant traverses this rejection, and asserts that the final Action fails to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness.

A. Legal Standard for Obviousness

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest *all* the claim limitations. (See, *MPEP 2143*). To establish *prima facie* obviousness of a claimed invention, all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art. *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981, 180 USPQ 580 (CCPA 1974). Moreover, all words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art. *In re Wilson*, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970).

As with anticipation, the Examiner bears the burden of proof to provide a factual basis to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §103. *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting *In re Warner*, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016, 154 USPQ 173, 177 (CCPA 1967)). Only if that burden is met, does the burden of going forward shift to the appellant.

B. Claims 24 and 27

Neither the final Action nor the Examiner's Answer establish a *prima facie* case that renders obvious claim 24. Further, there remains *no evidence of record whatsoever* to support the assertion in the final Action that claims 24 is obvious.

The final Action acknowledged that Katz fails to disclose associating a product identifier with one or more promotional codes, as recited in claim 24. The Action asserted that it would have been obvious to modify the method taught by Katz with the use of promotional codes “since it was known in the art that promotions are identified by codes to provide a way of tracking the promotions.” However, the Action failed to cite any references to support the assertion of obviousness or to assert Official Notice. Appellant traversed the rejection, and invited the Examiner to point out with specificity. The Examiner’s Answer maintains the rejection and still fails to cite any reference to support the rejection or to assert Official Notice

In sum, there is no evidence of record to support the assertion. Therefore, the rejection is improper and must be withdrawn. (See MPEP 2144.03).

In the Examiner’s Response section of the second Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner asserts that teaches the future of providing promotional items such as coupons associated with the primary transaction,”[the upsell is an] offer of a good or service, or to a coupon, ticket, card or other promotional material having a variable or designated value for the purchase, lease or other acquisition in the future of a good or service” and it is well known in the art to use a code such as a barcode as an identifier. It would have been obvious to a skilled artisan in the marketing art to include code as a tracking feature to ensure proper matching and verification during redemption of the promotion. Again, Appellant expresses no opinion on the accuracy of the Examiner’s characterization of the Katz reference. However, the Examiner’s characterization of the Katz reference is wholly unrelated to the language of the limitations recited in claim 24. Therefore, even if the Examiner’s characterization is accurate, Katz still cannot render obvious claim 24.

In sum, neither the final Action nor the Examiner’s answer has established the factual evidence necessary to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness of claim 24. Furthermore,

Katz fails to disclose or suggest elements of claim 24, and therefore cannot render obvious claim 24. Therefore, the rejection of claim nine under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) must be reversed.

Claim 27 recites corresponding limitations. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to claim 27.


CONCLUSIONS

The Examiner's Answer fails to provide an evidentiary record sufficient to support an anticipation rejection of claims 9-23, 25, 26 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. §102. Therefore, Appellant urges the Board to reverse the examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. §102 of claims 9-23, 25, 26 and 28.

Further, the Examiner's Answer fails to provide an evidentiary record sufficient to support an obviousness rejection of claims 24 and 27 under 35 U.S.C. §103. Therefore, Appellant urges the Board to reverse the examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. §103 of claims 24 and 27.

Respectfully submitted,

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jed W. Caven".

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